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THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
AFTER FIVE YEARS

By E. L. FISHER*
I. HISTORICAL
The enactment in 1946 of legislation recognizing a general
liability on the part of the United States, and providing definite
machinery for enforcement thereof, for damage or injury caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of employees of
the Government while acting within the §cope of their employment,' brought to an end an era of Federal immunity from responsibility frequently and harshly criticized by the bar and by
students of government alike.
It is interesting to note that the barrier of sovereign immunity which precluded a judicial remedy against the Government
for its wrongdoing, other than for breach of contract or pursuant to specific authorization by Congress,' resulted, in the
*General Counsel. General Accounting Office, Washington, D.C.; LL.B.,
1933, National University; Member, Federal Bar Association and Bar
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
1. The original Federal Tort Claims Act, approved August 2, 1946, 60
STAT. 842, as amneded August 1, 1947, 61 STAT. 722, was repealed concomitantly with ccdification of its provisions under the title "Judicial
Code and Judiciary." 62 STAT. 897 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
1402(b), 1504, 2401(b); 2042, 2411-12, and 2671-80 (Supp. 1949). Also,
there have been subsequent amendments, 63 STAT. 62(1949), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2401(b) (Supp. 1950), and 63 STAT. 444 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2680
(Supp. 1950).
2. Recognized beginning with establishment of the Court of Claims, 10
STAT. 612 (1855), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. 1951), to hear
claims "founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied,
with the Government," and the extension of concurrent jurisdiction to
the United States District Courts by the Tucker Act, 24 STAT. 505
(1887), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (Supp. 1951), where not more
than $10,000 might be involved, to adjudicate claims "for damages,
liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort." These grants
of jurisdiction were construed to exclude tort claims. Gibbons v. United
States. 8 Wall. 269, 19 L. Ed. 453 (1868) ; Hill v. United States, 149
U.S. 593, 13 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L. Ed. 862 (1892).
3. Among the instances where Congress had authorized suits or provided
administrative machinery for determination of legal responsibility under customary rules of law, mention may be made of acts permitting
suit for infringement of patents, 36 STAT. 851 (1910), as amended,
62 STAT. 941 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (Supp. 1951) ; establishing an
Employees Compensation Commission, 39 STAT. 742 (1916) ; conferring
power on the head of each executive department and independent
establishment to settle claims for damages to or loss of privately
owned property, not over $1,000, "caused by the negligence of any officer
or employee of the Government, acting within the scope of his employment," 42 STAT. 1066 (1922) ; authorizing suits for damage caused by
public vessels, 43 STAT. 1112 (1925) ; and numerous acts conferring
on the heads of certain departments limited powers to settle tort
claims in-small amounts, usually not exceeding $500.

(263)
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words of Professor Borchard, from an "historical error," and
was "neither sound, just nor responsive to the demands of modern social engineering." ' The eighteenth century concept that
"The king can do no wrong" apparently originally meant that
the king was not privileged to do wrong, not that he was incapable of doing wrong or immune to liability for the consequences of wrongdoing. Only through misinterpretation and
a process or rationalization has it been accepted in the United
States as precedent for the doctrine of the Government's nonsuability in tort-that there can be no legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.' The
great influence of the doctrine is illustrated by the fact that
Government corporations created in recent years with authority
"to sue and be sued" in their own names could not, in fact, be
sued in tort until the decision of the Supreme Court in Kiefer &
Kiefer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp.'
The incompatibility between sovereign irresponsibility in tort
and constitutional government under which the federal state derives its powers from the governed has been recognized and
voiced by many. Witness President Lincoln's statement, in a preCivil War message to the Congress, "It is as much the duty of
Government to render proper justice against itself, in favor of
citizens, as it is to administer the same between private individuals." 7 Recently, Chief Justice Vinson, writing for the Court
in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., stated
It is argued that the principle of sovereign immunity is an archaic
hangover not consonant with modern morality and that it should

therefore be limited wherever possible. There may be substance
in such a viewpoint as applied to suits for damages. The Congress
has increasingly permitted such .suits to be maintained against the
sovereign and we should give hospitable scope to that trend.8

However, it is not entirely fair to infer that no remedy of
any kind was available to the faultless individual who had suffered damage or injury through governmental invasion of his rights.
He could and did petition Congress for redress. The first private
relief act for a tort claim was enacted in 1792, compensating the
4.

Edwin M. Borcard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 11 A.B.A.J.
495 (1925).
5. Hill v. United States, 9 How. 386, 13 L. Ed. 185 (1850) ; Gibbons v.
United States, 8 Wall. 269, 19 L. Ed. 453 (1868) ; Kawananakoa v.
Polybank. 205 U.S. 349, 27 S.Ct. 526.51 L. Ed. 834 (1907).
6. 306 U.S. 381, 59 S.Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784 (1939).
7. Mentioned in Irvin M. Gottlieb's discussion, The Federal Tort Claims
Act, 35 GEo. L.J. 1 (1946).
8. 337 U.S. 682, 703, 69 S.Ct. 1457, 1468, 93 L. Ed. 1628, 1643 (1949).
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schools of Wilmington, Delaware, for damages suffered from
troops during the Revolutionary War2 Since that time, thousands
of such measures have been presented and considered. In fact,
by 1946 their numbers had increased to an average of between
two and three thousand each Congress. This reservation by the
Congress to itself of authority to deal with tort claims generally,
despite painstaking and conscientious consideration of such
claims by its committees, not only left the injured party to the
uncertain graces of political eventuality but merited severe reprobation because the burden it imposed infringed upon the
time of the legislators to consider matters of pressing national
importance. As early as 1832, the farsighted John Quincy
Adams wrote, in his memoirs, "There ought to be no private business before Congress."'"
The agitation for reform of the cumbersome private bill system bore its first fruit in H.R. 14737 of the Sixty-fifth Congress
(i919), and thereafter the subject was almost continuously before the Senate or the House of Representatives in one form or
another. Mr. Justice Reed summarized the legislative history
when, in United States 'v. Spelar, he wrote, "The Federal Tort
Claims Act of 1946 was the product of some twenty-eight years
of congressional drafting and redrafting, amendment and counter-amendment."' 1
Whether the inadequacies of legislative relief, or the necessity that Congress free itself from the importunities of tort claimants and the time consuming burden of considering their cases,
or a combination of both, was responsible, the gradual transfer
of claims by Congress from political to legal channels-first in
contract cases, then in special classes of small tort claims, and
culminating in adoption of the tort claims statute as Title IV
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946-has laid to
rest most of the academic controversy over the wisdom of the
course theretofore followed in this country and, through the
concept of respondeat superior inherent in the statute, appears
to have established a permanent foundation for protection
through legal processes of the individual's personal rights in his
relations with the Federal Government.
The various provisions of the new statute now have been tested in the courts in many respects by five years of experience in
their administration. Contrary to the expectations of those who
feared that, due to the influence of the common law doctrine of
strict construction of a waiver of sovereign immunity, its pro9. 6 STAT. 8 (1792).

10.

See note 7, supra.

11.

338 U.S. 217, 219, 70 S.Ct. 10, 11, 94 L. Ed. 3, 6 (1949).
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visions would be construed as much as possible in line therewith
for the protection of the Government and its officers against the
consequences of their wrongful acts, the application of that doctrine has been repudiated by the Supreme Court in the recent
Aetna case.'" Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the Court, said
"We think that the congressional attitude in passing the Tort
Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's
statement . . . 'The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough, where consent has been withheld. We
are not to add to its rigor by refinement of construction, where
consent has been announced." 3"'
It thus appears almost certain that full effect will be given to
the expressed intent of Congress that the United States shall
be liable as a private person on claims within the coverage of
the statute.
II. STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Liability.-At the time the original Federal Tort Claims Act
was re-enacted in codified form,'" the liability provision of section
410(a), constituting the heart of the act, was raised to the
proper dignity of an independent section.' 5 Therein the United
States is declared to be "liable," respecting the provisions relating to tort claims, "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances," although
not for "interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages." 6
Exclusions.- Thirteen categories of claims are excepted from
the coverage provided.' They are claims(a) based upon an act or omission of an employee, "exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether
or not such statute or regulation be valid," or based upon "the
exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform
a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency
12. United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383, 70 S.Ct.
207. 216, 94 L. Ed. 171, 186 (1949).
13. Anderson v. Hayes Const. Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29-30
(1926).
14. See note 1, supra. The codification involves changes in language, but
the revisor's note states that "Minor changes were made in phraseology."
15. 62 STAT. 983 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1951).
16. If, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place where
the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the liability
undertaken is for "actual or compensatory damages, measured by the
pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the action was brought, in lieu thereof."
17. 62 STAT. 984 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 444 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2680
(Supp. 1951).
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or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."
(b) arising out of the "loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matter."
(c) arising "in respect of the assessment or collection of any
tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer."
(d) for which a remedy is provided in admiralty law by 46
U.S.C. Sections 741-752 and 781-790.
(e) arising out of an act or omission in "administering" the
Trading with the Enemy Act, So U.S.C. Appendix Sections 1-3 1.
(f) for damages caused by the "imposition or establishment
of a quarantine by the United States."
(g) arising from "injury to vessels, or to the cargo, crew or
passengers of vessels, while passing through the locks of the
Panama Canal or while in Canal Zone waters."
(h) arising out of "assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights."
(i) for damages "caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system."
(j) arising out of the "combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war."
(k) arising "in a foreign country."
(1) arising from the "activities"
Authority.

of the Tennessee Valley

(m) arising from the "activities" of the Panama Canal
Company (formerly Panama Railroad Company).
Suit.-The declaration of liability is amplified, and technical
immunity from suit is waived, through grant to the United States
District Courts of exclusive jurisdiction "of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing
on and after January I, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circum-
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stances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance ' 8with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.' 1
The jurisdiction conferred includes jurisdiction over counterclaims and set-off. 9
Judgment in such an action is made "a complete bar to any
action by the claimant, by reason of the same subject matter,
against the employee of210 the Government whose act or omission
gave rise to the claim. '
Where a small claim has been presented for administrative
settlement,2 1 suit may not be commenced thereon until the agency
concerned has made final disposition thereof, unless the claim is
withdrawn "upon fifteen days written notice," and in no instance
may suit be instituted for a sum in excess of the amount of the
claim presented to the agency, "except where the increased
amount is based upon newv discovered evidence not reasonably
discoverable at the time of presenting the claim to the federal
agency, or upon allegation and proof
of intervening facts, re22
lating to the amount of the claim.''
Moreover,
claims "shall be tried by the court without a
'3
'

ju ry.

1

JddninistrativcJddjstment.-The head of each Federal agency or his designee for this purpose is authorized, on the same
basis, to adjust and settle, without prejudice to the right to sue
of the claimant who does not choose to accept the administrative
determination of his claim (but finally insofar as other officers
of the Government are2-1 concerned), small tort claims not exceeding .I,ooo in amount.
Disposition in this manner "shall25 not be competent evidence
of liability or amount of damages.
Acceptance by the claimant of an administrative award constitutes a complete release by the claimant of claims both against
the United States and against the employee responsible for
the wrong.
Venue.-Note that civil actions on tort claims against the
United States "may be prosecuted only in the judicial district
18. 63 STAT. 101 (1940), 29 U.S.C. s 1246(b) (Supp. 19511.
19. 62 STAT. 101 (1949). 28 U.S.C. § 13 4 6(c) (Sums. 1951 I.
20. P,2 STAT. 984 (1949). 28 U.S.C. $ 2f76 (Supp. 1051).

21. See "Administrative Adjustment," infra.
22. 62 STAT. 983 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 107 (1949). 28 U.S.C. § 2675
(a)

and (h)

(Sui). 1951).

23. 62 STAT. 971 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (Supp. 1951).
24. 62 STAT. 983 (1948), as amended, 64 STAT. 987 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2672
(Sunp. 1951).
25. 62 STAT. 9M2 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 107 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2675
(Supp. 1951).
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where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred. ' '16 Similarly, jurisdiction over claims of
$i,ooo or less appears to be vested only in the Federal agencies
out of whose activities the liability arises."
Compromise.-The Attorney General may, with the approval
of the court, "compromise, or settle any claim" upon which suit
has been commenced, " and such disposition "shall not be competent evidence of liability or amount of damages. 29
A ppeal.-In providing for review of district court judgments,
jurisdiction is given in the first instance to the Circuit Courts of
Appeals" and, in the alternative, if the notice of appeal filed
in the district court "has affixed thereto the written consent on
behalf of all the appellees,"' l and provided appeal "be taken
within ninety days after the entry of the final judgment of the
district court,"' '1

2

to the Court of Claims. Review by the Supreme

Court of cases decided by the Circuit Courts of Appeals and
the Court of Claims
is covered by the provisions of law relating
33
to those tribunals.

Attorney's Fees.-Of especial importance to attorneys who
represent tort claimants are provisions concerning their fees.U
The district courts, the heads of agencies, and the Attorney
General, as a part of the judgments, awards or compromises
effected by them, may "determine and allow reasonable attorney
fees." A maximum of ten percent is fixed in the case of recoveries
of $5oo or more through award by the head of an agency or
settlement of the Attorney General. In the case of a judgment,
the maximum is set at twenty percent of the amount recovered.
In either case, the fees are "to be paid out of but not in addition
to the amount of judgment, award, or settlement recovered, to
the attorneys representing the claimant." If the attorney "charges
demands, receives or collects for services rendered" any sum
in excess of that provided for, he "shall be fined not more
than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both."
Costs, Judgments and Interest.-Where suit is brought in a
district court, "costs shall be allowed in all courts to the successful claimant, but such costs shall not include attorney's fees."'"
26. 63 STAT. 937 (1948). 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b)
27.

29.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

(Supp. 1951).

DEC. CoMp. GEN. B-103279 (1951).

62 STAT. 9R4 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (Supp). 1951).
28 U.S.C. § 2 675(c) (Supp. 1951). See note 25, supra.
62 STAT. 929 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (Supp. 1951).
62 STAT. 942 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1504 (Supp. 1951).
62 STAT. 963 (1948). 28 U.S.C. § 2110 (Supn. 1951).
62 STAT. 928 (1948). 28 U.S. 5§ 1254. 1255 (Supp.
'isor's Note. 28 U.S.C. § 1504 (SunD. 1951).
62 STAT. 984 (1948). 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (Sutm. 1951).
62 STAT. 973 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(c) (Supp. 1951).
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The limitation, it will be observed, complements the provision
that attorney's fees are to be paid out of the principal amount
recoverecl.
Payment of final judgments rendered by the district courts
against the United States is made on settlements by the General
Accounting Office." Interest is payable at tile rate of four percent "from the date of the judgment up to, but not exceeding,
thirty days after the date of approval of any appropriation Act
providing for payment of the judgment."'"
Statute of Limnitation.-A claim is "forever barred" unless
action is begun or it is presented in writing to the appropriate
Federal agency "within two years after such claim accrues."
However, if an appropriate claim has been presented in writing
to a Federal agency within that period of time, suit is not barred
"until the expiration of a period of six months after either
the
date of withdrawal of such claim from the agency or the date of
mailing notice by the agency of final disposition of the claim."'
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.-In revising the Judicial
Code (Title 28 of the United States Code) certain provisions
of Section 411 of the original Federal Tort Claims Act were
omitted as unnecessary because "the Rules of Civil Procedure
promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all civil
actions. '"" The omitted portion provided that "the forms of
process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure, shall be in accordance with the rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to the Act of June 19, 1934 (48 STAT.
io64) ; and the same provisions for counterclaim and set-off . ..
shall be applicable as in cases brought in the United States District Courts under the Act of March 3, 1887 (24 STAT. 505)."
Exclusiveness of Rem edies.-The remedies provided are exclusive, and this is true even in instances where the responsible
Federal agency may sue or be sued eo nomine"

III.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Even the many years of study and planning merged into the
provisions of the new law could not prevent serious problems
arising after its enactment. The tremendous size and diverse
activities of the Federal establishment invited an enormous flow
36. (;2 STAT. 974 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2414 (Supp. 1951).
37. 62 STAT. 973 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 106 (1949). 28 U.S.C. § 2411
(b) (Supp. 1951) and Revisor's Note.
38. 63 STAT. 971 (1948), as amended, 63 STAT. 62 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 2401
(b) (Supp. 1951).
39. SEN. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., amend. No. 61 (1948).
40. 62 STAT. 984 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (Supp. 1951).
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of claims both to the agencies and to the courts. From a practical
working viewpoint, contusion concerning the extent to which
sovereign immunity had been relaxed, and the complexities introduced as a result of the impact of state law (in connection
with the requirement that liability be determined "in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred"),
undoubtedly have multiplied the task of administration and statutory construction.
Parties: Subrogation.-At the outset, there was considerable
uncertainty as to whether persons who had acquired rights
through subrogation should be recognized as proper claimants.
For example, could an insurance company, whose only interest
in the claim was derived from having paid to its insured a portion or all of the insured's claim against the United States, enforce its rights under the law? A choice of sides in the controversy obviously depended upon a liberal or a strict interpretation
of the legislative intent, as is evidenced in the contrariety of decisions in the lower courts.
The conflict was resolved by the Supreme Court in the Aetna
case." Therein the Government had contended that the AntiAssignment Act" made any transfer or assignment of a claim,
except for assignments made after payment of the claim, void,
and that inconvenience, administrative and accounting difficulties, and procedural problems would ensue if subrogees were
permitted to bring suits in their own names.
In the opinion of the Court, the Congress had been fully cognizant of the established rule that subrogation claims were not
within the bar of the Anti-Assignment Act at the time the tort
claims act was passed, and "The broad sweep of its language assuming the liability of a private person, the purpose of Congress
to relieve itself of consideration of private claims, and the fact
that subrogation claims made up a substantial part of the burden are also persuasive that Congress did not intend that such
claims should be barred."
In holding that the Government must defend suits by subrogees as if it were a private person, the Court pointed out that
where a subrogee has paid the full amount of the claim it becomes the only real party in interest, and must sue in its own
name, under Rule 17(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
instances of partial subrogation, the court stated that both insured and insurer "own" portions of the substantive right and
should appear in the litigation in their own names. Both are
"necessary" parties and the United States may compel joinder
41. Note 12, supra.
42.

61 STAT. 501 (1947), 31 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. 1951).
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under Rule i9(b). (Also, in the event separate actions are
commenced joinder may be required under Rule 42(a)). The
Court held that the pleadings should be made to reveal and assert the actual interest of the plaintiff, and to indicate the interests of any others in the claim. Problems concerning counterclaim or set-off against the original injured person in subrogation
cases were recognized but specifically not passed upon.
Parties: Persons in the Armed Forces.- The status of
servicemen has presented troublesome questions, due both to exclusion from liability of claims arising out of combat activities
of the military and naval forces or the Coast Guard, in time of
war, and to the fact that other statutes provide for disability
payments to servicemen.

In the Brooks case," the Supreme Court considered claims
arising from the negligence of a civilian employee of the Army
operating an Army truck which resulted in death and injury to
persons in the armed forces on leave from their posts of duty.
The Court was quick to reject the Government's contention that
dire consequences would result from recognizing liability in
such circumstances-a battle commander's poor judgment, an
army surgeon's slip of hand, a defective jeep which caused injury-saying that the accident was not service connected and
had nothing to do with the servicemen's army careers. It stated,
"We are not persuaded that 'any claim' means 'any claim but
that of servicemen' . . . It would be absurd to believe that Con-

gress did not have the servicemen in mind in 1946, when this
statute was passed. The overseas and combatant activities exceptions make this plain."
Mr. Justice Murphy pointed out in the opinion that provisions
in other statutes for disability payments to servicemen, and
gratuity payments to their survivors, indicate no purpose to
forbid tort actions under the Tort Claims Act. The Court refused
to call either remedy in the present case exclusive, or to pronounce a doctrine of election of remedies, when Congress had
not done so. However, in remanding the case to the Court of
Appeals, it was recognized that such a view "does not mean that
the amount payable under servicemen's benefit laws should not
be deducted, or taken into consideration, when the serviceman
obtains judgment under the Tort Claims Act . . . We now see

no indication that Congress meant the United States to pay
twice for the same injury." The problem of reducing damages
pro tanto, if decided to be proper, was left entirely to the lower
court.
43. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 91R. 9.9 L. Ed. 1200 (1949).
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Three additional cases which were heard and decided
together, the Feres, Griggs and Jefferson cases," involving claims
arising from injuries sustained by servicemen while on active
duty and not on furlough, also have been considered by the Supreme Court. Mr. Justice Jackson concluded, on behalf of the
Court, that "the Government is not liable under the Federal
Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service."
The distinction drawn by the words "activities incident to service" is between situations where, as in the Brooks case, the
serviceman was on furlough under compulsion of no orders or
duty and on no military mission, and those where, as in the Jefferson case, the serviceman was required to undergo an abdominal
operation while in the Army and the Army surgeon negligently
left a towel in his stomach; where, as in the Feres case, it was alleged that the serviceman on active duty had perished in quarters
negligently assigned because unsafe due to a defective heating
plant and failure to maintain an adequate fire watch; or where,
as in the Griggs case, the complaint was that the serviceman
while on active duty met death because of negligent and unskillful medical treatment by army surgeons.
Exclusions - Foreiqn Countries.-The only case so far decided bv the Supreme Court dealing with exclusions is the Spelar
case. 5 The claim alleged that Flight Engineer Spelar lost his
life in a take-off crash at Harmon Field, Newfoundland, an air
base leased by Great Britain to the United States, in consequence of the Government's negligent operation thereof. The
Court stated that "in brief, though Congress was ready to lay
aside a great portion of the sovereign's ancient and unquestioned
immunity from suit, it was unwilling to subject the United States
to liabilities depending upon the. laws of a foreign power. The
legislative will must be restected. The present suit, premised
entirely upon Newfoundland's law, may not be asserted against
the United States in contravention of that will."
Cornproinise.-In connection with the provision that "the
Attorney General, with the approval of the Court may arbitrate,
compromise, or settle any claim cognizable under Section 1346-4
(b) of this title, after the commencement of an action thereon," 6
even though a compromise is submitted after the case has reached
responsibility" for passing
the Supreme Court, "the authority and
47
thereon is that of the district court.
44.
45.
4 A.
47.

Feres v. United States. 340 IT.S. 135. 71 S.Ct. 153. 95 L. Ed. 1.52 (1950).
United States v. Soelar. 338 T.S. 217.70 S.Ct. 10.94 L. Ed. 3 (1949).
r2 STAT. 984 (1948). 28 U.S.C. § 2677 (Supo. 1951).
Hubsch v. United States, 338 U.S. 440, 70 S.Ct. 225, 94 L. Ed. 244
(1949).
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Parties- Joinder and Impleader.-It was held in the Yellow
Cab Company case" that the United States District Courts are
empowered to require the United States to be impleaded as a
third party defendant and to answer the claim of a joint tort
feasor for contribution as if the United States were a private
individual. Mr. Justice Burton, in the opinion, considered the
Government's contentions that, even though liability for contribution be found, procedural difficulties would be encountered in
impleading the United States because, among other things, the
original individual defendant would be entitled to a jury trial as
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, but
did not find them difficult of solution, in view of the applicability
of Rules 14(a) and 4 2(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It
was concluded that the Government had consented to be sued for
contribution not only in a separate proceeding but also as a thirdparty defendant.
IV.

GENERAL COMMENT

Apart from the decisions of the Supreme Court, which display
through their own excellence of analysis and interpretation the
merits of the tort claims provisions in their own right, many
other decisions have been rendered by the Courts of Appeals
and the district courts. Some of the earlier opinions are contradictory, indicating embarrassing uncertainty in the application
of rules of statutory construction. Investigation of still unsettled
and troublesome problems, which range from judicial establishment of the more obvious statutory directions to complex and
novel problems encountered in applying them, is of challenging
legal interest, as are other matters involving policy. In passing
over this field, the major areas of which have been treated with
great \ability and discernment by Professor Blanton in his articles,4" it is apparent that the expanded needs of the public
should encourage the practicing lawyer to familiarize himself
(or herself) with the general subject. In this connection, Professor Blanton notes that the statutory restrictions on attorney's
fees reduce them below those prevailing in tort cases in most
iurisdictions, which may hinder the acceptance of worthy cases,
but that "From the volume of business under the Act any fear
on this score is apparently not well-founded."
The availability of redress through administrative adjustment
where interests (including those of subrogees) in a single claim
48.

United States v. YelloW Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 71 S.Ct. 399, 95 L. Ed.

523 (1951).
49.

Fred Blanton, The Federal Tort Claims Act in Action, 53 DICK. L. REV.
163 (1948), and Two More Years of the Federal Tort Claivms Act, 55
DICK. L. REV. 301 (1951).
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do not exceed $i,ooo in the aggregate5 0 should not be discounted.
Such claims are in a majority. While settlement is largely on an
ex parte basis, which might lead to a fear that the agencies
would be acutely defense conscious, as they perhaps have been at
first, that fear would appear to be justified only to the extent that
a claimant's position should be fully presented for evaluation
with the official record. In any event, the fact that a case may be
withdrawn and taken to the courts insures that agency action
will follow as closely as is practicable the pattern set by judicial
decisions. Also, in fairness to the conscientious body of administrative personnel who handle such cases, it is felt they are mindful that justice is done to the United States when the claims of
its individual citizens are settled justly under the law.
As of July, I95I, there were 2,500,889 civilian employees of
the Government."' In addition, there were several million servicement in our expanding armed forces. The potential of negligent conduct on the part of this personnel continually threatens
to mature into vast Federal responsibilities under the statutea prospect not minimized by the frequency of accidents.
The Government's only defense to improper claims, as well
as its evaluation of proper claims, depends upon thorough means
of ascertaining for record purposes accurate facts concerning
all acts and omissions out of which tort liability may arise, regardless of whether promising trivial or major consequences.
The responsibility of reporting, investigating, and maintaining
adequate records, irrespective of whether settlement is to be
accomplished through administrative or court action, devolves
upon the Federal agencies concerned. Protection of the Government's interests in these matters has made uniform practices advisable, and the steps taken toward that end include the establishment of an Interdepartmental Committee on the Federal Tort
Claims Act-an advisory group composed of representatives
of the various cooperating Federal agencies-under the sponsorship of the Department of Justice. No small portion of the total
expense to the Government of administering the law is attributable to work of such general nature, the cost of which is not
susceptible to measurement by existing means."
Statistics.-Completely accurate statistics as to numbers and
amounts of claims attributable to the tort claims statute are not
available. However, it has been possible to collect information
50.

41 Ops. ATTY. GEN. 13.

51.

REPORT, JOINT COMMITTEE ON REDUCTION OF NONESSENTIAL
EXPENDITURES, 97 CONG. REC. 11344-7 (1951).
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52. Expenses in connection with possible claims under the statute may be
charged to appropriations available for general agency administration,
29 CoMp. GEN. 111.
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and to project figures that show roughly the true situation, separately, with respect to claims upon which suit has been instituted
and claims presented for administrative adjustment.
Data obtained from the Federal Tort Claims Section of the
Claims Division, Department of Justice, as adjusted, 3 appears
to furnish reliable information as to suits entered and settled
during the five Federal fiscal years ended June 30, i951, as
follows:
1947
Suits
Judgments
Compromises

1948

1949

1950

1951
(Incomplete)

654
1,475
1.212
1,013
1.122
$207,500 $706,107 $1,342,250 $1,218,123 $891,040
$ 66,063 $506,069 $1,397,567 $1,321,383 $802,984

On July I, I95I, there were left pending 2,926 cases for a
total amount of $434,918,175.44. Not included were 322 cases
for a total amount of $12,654,333.46, which had been entered
against employees or agencies individually, presumably involving
ultimate Federal liability.
The respective agencies are required to "report annually to
Congress all claims paid . . . stating . . . the amount claimed,
the amount awarded . . . "" A preliminary analysis of such reports disclosed that the nature of the information required, the
fact that different annual reporting periods were employed in a
number of instances, and a general incompleteness and lack of
uniformity in presentation for statistical purposes, made them
unsuitable for use here.
However, most of the tort claims subject to administrative
adjustment originate from activities of the Post Office Department, the Department of Defense (Army, Navy and Air Force),
the Department of the Treasury, and the Veterans' Administration. Data obtained from these agencies has been employed as a
basis upon which to project 5 what is believed to be a feasonable
approximation of actual figures, as follows:
53. The official figures were increased by five per cent to compensate for
(a) claims not recorded because classified as admiralty or different
matters and processed by other bureaus of the Department, and (b)
claims not included because brought against agencies or employees
individually (although apparently involving ultimate Federal liability).
54. 62 STAT. 983 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2673 (Supp. 1951).
55. Available data from the Department of Defense, the Department of
the Treasury, the Post Office Department, and the Veterans' Administration showed only the number of claims allowed, necessitating an
increase by one-third-a percentage corresponding to the ratio found
to exist in instances where complete figures were available-to adjus't
for claims entertained but disallowed or abandoned. Compromise settlements by the Attorney General, which are paid out of agency funds,
were eliminated from the amounts of awards. Both numbers of claims
and amounts of awards were increased by an estimated five per cent to
project figures for the Government as a whole.
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Awards
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1948

1949

1950

1951

15,875
15,950
16.925
19,324
12,149
$825,400 $1,513,400 $1,825,700 $1,120,500 $1,038,000

It might seem from the 195o and I95I figures that claims

and amounts are decreasing. However, such a view would not be
justified. Among other things, at the beginning of the i95o fiscal
year the period within which claims could be presented was enlarged from one to two years. Also, backlogs of unprocessed
claims have increased generally since that time. Recent filings
appear to be in greater numbers and for larger amounts than
in 195o or 1951.

